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Introduction 
The reawakened interest in competition issues in agricultural markets might appear to have found its 
ideal poster child in the seed industry. Concentration is high and market structure has shown 
remarkable dynamics over the last 15 years, with high-profile mergers and acquisitions by key players. A 
dominant firm—Monsanto—seems to have emerged, at least from the perspective of biotech traits 
perceived as essential in modern seed varieties. The two largest US seed companies, DuPont and 
Monsanto, have embarked on a tough legal battle. And the Department of Justice (DOJ) has opened a 
formal antitrust investigation of Monsanto practices. Yet, despite its many motives of interest, the seed 
industry’s competition issues are probably not representative of what matters in other agricultural 
markets. A distinctive feature is that, in the seed industry, innovation is crucial and heavily dependent 
on sizeable research and development (R&D) investments. Commitment to R&D by private firms, in 
turn, relies crucially on the existence and enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs), patents in 
particular. Strong IPRs necessarily confer limited monopoly positions. Whereas that is well understood 
and widely accepted as a reasonable method to promote the provision of innovation by the private 
sector, there remains an inherent tension between IPR and antitrust concerns in this industry. 
 
IPRs and Innovation in the Seed Industry 
Agricultural research can claim remarkable achievements over the last century, with impressive 
productivity gains that have ensured the availability of an abundant and safe food supply that meets the 
needs of a growing world population. Celebrated successes such as those underlying the Green 
Revolution owe much to public funds supporting research in public institutions. But the current 
structure of R&D is much more dependent on private investments. In the US economy, industry R&D at 
present accounts for more than two-thirds of total R&D investments. More specifically, in agriculture, 
private R&D has exceeded public R&D expenditures since the early 1980s. To feed a growing world 
population, and to meet the competing demands on land from bioenergy, it is apparent that continued 
productivity growth is essential. Inasmuch as that depends on new and improved seed varieties, the 
heavy lifting will have to be done by private R&D investments, and the availability of secure, 
enforceable, and strong IPRs is, arguably, a necessity. 
Knowledge is the quintessential public good—nonrival in consumption and, in and of itself, 
nonexcludable. Absent IPRs, it is clear that economic agents have little incentive to engage in expensive 
R&D that can create new and useful knowledge. Why undertake the costs of being an innovator if one 
can wait for others to do that and reap the same benefits by copying and imitation? The prospect of 
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such destructive “free riding” behavior has long been acknowledged, and most developed economies 
have implemented strong legal measures to protect the rights of inventors. For plants, in the United 
States such measures include trade secrets, the 1970 Plant Variety Protection (PVP) Act and—following 
the landmark US Supreme Court decisions in Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) and J.E.M. Ag Supply v. 
Pioneer (2001)—utility patents. The latter provide the strongest protection and are now routinely used 
for biotechnology research tools, genetically modified (GM) traits, and traditional germplasm. Patents 
grant to the innovator the right to exclude others (for a limited time period) from using the patented 
product or process. Such exclusionary rights can be a source of considerable returns if there is a strong 
demand for the innovation because it effectively allows the patent holder to behave as a monopolist. It 
is the prospect of such returns that provides the needed incentive for investment in R&D (Langinier and 
Moschini, 2002). Of course, this market solution to the problem of promoting innovation is second best 
in nature: once the innovation is available, the patent actually restricts its use and it is a source of (ex 
post) efficiency loss. 
 Seed companies need property rights to justify their substantial R&D investments. For example, 
the prospect of farmers saving a portion of their harvest to use as seed in the next period obviously 
reduces the ability of suppliers to recoup the cost of improved seeds over many growing seasons. Prior 
to the possibility of using patents to prevent that, it is not surprising that the crop that attracted most 
private R&D investments was maize—saving seeds does not work well with hybrid varieties. The 
development of a vibrant maize seed industry owes much to the natural property rights protection 
offered by the hybrid technology, over and above the remarkable discovery of the productivity effects of 
hybrid vigor. But patent protection is now available on many aspects of seed production, including GM 
traits and varieties, and that has tremendously enlarged the scope of profitable private R&D 
investments in the seed industry. Indeed, patents have been crucial to the commercialization of modern 
biotech varieties. Seed suppliers can market elite varieties, embedding herbicide and/or insect 
resistance traits, and charge a price premium, without the fear that others might misappropriate the 
product and compete unfairly in future periods or that farmers might save a portion of their harvest for 
replanting, thereby negating a market for the product for future periods.  
 
Biotechnology and Industry Dynamics 
The nature of innovation in the seed industry has been radically affected by the biotechnology 
revolution in agriculture, a development that has produced exciting innovations as well as some 
unexpected and unresolved problems (Moschini, 2008). Specifically, modern seed varieties of major 
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crops, such as corn, soybeans, cotton, and canola, derive their value to users from two sources that are 
both essential: germplasm and GM traits. The latter, of course, refer to the traits engineered by 
insertion into plants of foreign genes—typically single genes, which may however be stacked—that 
confer a desirable attribute, such as herbicide tolerance or insect resistance. Germplasm refers to the 
sum total of all hereditary material in a plant, as coded in its DNA. For a crop, it reflects the 
compounding nature of sequential improvements carried out by breeders over a long period of time, all 
of which, of course, is encapsulated in the seed.  
 Not surprisingly, commercial breeders are keen on protecting the results of their efforts from 
misappropriation, and a complex set of IPRs has emerged to help them do so. The 1970 PVP Act allowed 
for the creation of patent-like “certificates” for new, distinct, uniform, and stable varieties. This sui 
generis IPR protection was developed at a time when it was believed that living organisms did not 
constitute patentable subject matter. But all that changed in 1980 with the landmark US Supreme Court 
decision of Diamond v. Chakrabarty. It is important to understand that utility patents can now be used 
to assert germplasm ownership for traditionally bred varieties, and not just for GM traits. Other IPR 
protection instruments that are relevant to the seed industry include trade secrets—which have been 
effectively used for maize inbred lines in a few high-profile litigations—and material transfer 
agreements. Because patents provide a stronger protection than PVP certificates (Moschini and 
Yerokhin, 2007), breeders have started to favor their use. Some evidence in this respect is shown in 
Figure 1, which reports the number of PVP certificates and patents on varieties, issued over the 30-year 
period ending in 2009, for both corn and soybeans. Specifically, such counts are reported as total for 
five-year periods, to smooth out year-to-year variations partly due to the vagaries of the approval 
process. It is clear that, in the most recent half of the period considered, the use of utility patents for 
plant varieties has increased considerably. In the last 5 years, in particular, the number of variety 
patents issued for corn and soybeans far exceeds that of PVP certificates.  
 Monsanto was not in the seed business prior to the advent of agricultural biotechnology, and it 
is now the largest seed company in the world. This remarkable evolution has its roots in the advent of 
agricultural biotechnology and the ability to engineer crops with herbicide tolerance and insect 
resistance traits (Economist, 2009). Such novel possibilities held the potential to profoundly affect 
farmers’ demand for herbicides and pesticides, not just seed, and brought about a confluence between 
the agrochemical and seed industries. Monsanto invested early and decisively in agricultural 
biotechnology, leading to the release of GM varieties, first commercialized in 1996. Its early advantage 
and continued commitment to this R&D path has resulted in a dominant position in the GM traits found  
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Figure 1.  Number of U.S. PVPCs and Patents on Varieties, 1980-2009 (Source: USDA and USPTO) 
 
in commercialized varieties of soybeans, cotton, and corn. This is illustrated in Table 1, which is based on 
data made available by Monsanto to its investors (but percent values in this table are calculated based 
on USDA planted acres). Note that the share of US grown crops containing one or more Monsanto traits 
has increased steadily over time. In 2009, this share amounted to 81.1% in corn, 94.5% in soybeans, and 
78.9% in cotton. 
 GM traits such as herbicide tolerance or insect resistance are attractive to farmers because they 
offer both cost-reducing and yield-increasing opportunities. But clearly, to capitalize on this latent 
demand, GM traits need to be embedded into seed varieties available to farmers. To achieve the market 
penetration in GM traits illustrated in Table 1, Monsanto appears to have followed a two-pronged 
strategy. First, it acquired several seed companies that offered both a solid germplasm base and a 
recognized brand name, including Asgrow (soybeans) in 1997, Dekalb (corn) in 1998, and Holden’s 
Foundation Seed (a firm supplying maize inbred lines to other breeders) in 1997. These acquisitions 
provided an immediate, sizeable presence in the seed market and a vehicle to market its GM traits. 
Second, from the beginning Monsanto engaged in broad licensing of its GM traits to other seed 
companies, from small regional firms to large competitors. This broad licensing strategy leveraged the 
stock of elite germplasm held by other companies, as well as their seed commercialization channels, and 
thus allowed GM traits to be made available to more farmers much more quickly. This successful  
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           Table 1.  Market Penetration of Monsanto’s GM Traits, United States (Source: Monsanto)  
  2000 2005 2009 
     
  CORN Single-Trait Acres 17.2 27.8 14.1 
 Double-Trait Acres 0.1 13 4.5 
 Triple-Trait Acres 0 1.3 31.2 
 RR w/ Non-Monsanto Traits 0 0.5 20.7 
 Total Monsanto Trait Acres 17.3 42.6 70.6 
      % of total planted acres 21.8% 52.1% 81.1% 
     
  COTTON Single-Trait Acres 5.6 3.2 1.2 
 Double-Trait Acres 4.1 7.7 5.3 
 RR w/ Non-Monsanto Traits 0 0 0.7 
 Total Monsanto Trait Acres 9.7 10.9 7.1 
      % of total planted acres 62.6% 76.8% 78.9% 
     
  SOYBEANS Roundup Ready 45 66.4 71.7 
 Roundup Ready 2 Yield 0 0 1.5 
 Total Monsanto Trait Acres 45 66.4 73.2 
      % of total planted acres 60.4% 92.1% 94.5% 
 
 
strategy, of course, relied on the credible threat of a do-it-alone alternative made possible by the earlier 
seed company acquisitions, which also gave Monsanto considerable bargaining power in defining the 
clauses of its licensing agreements. 
 The foregoing discussion suggests that ownership of the germplasm is just as critical as the 
ownership of GM traits in order to understand the current status and possible future evolution of this 
industry. Table 1 provides some indications of the dominant position in GM traits accumulated by 
Monsanto, although one should note that other companies—including Dow AgroSciences, Syngenta, 
and DuPont—have competing GM traits that have been commercialized or are set to come to market. 
Conversely, Table 2 provides an indication of germplasm ownership by looking at utility patents for 
inbred lines, cultivars, and varieties for corn and soybeans, over the last 15 years (these are the patent 
count data used in Figure 1; soybean patents for which Monsanto and Stine are joint assignees are 
counted as half for each). Grouping these patent counts by company, accounting for the various mergers 
and acquisitions that took place over this period, Table 2 illustrates the dominant position of the top two 
companies, DuPont and Monsanto. The table also suggests the weakness of Dow, a company that has 
developed successful insect resistance traits but which apparently does not have a comparable strength 
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in germplasm platforms. Stine is a newer company that has focused its energy on soybean breeding. 
Also apparent is the absence of the public sector in patented germplasm, perhaps surprising given the 
general trend of increased university patenting promoted by the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act. Neither Table 1 
nor Table 2, of course, depicts market shares in actual commercialized seeds. On that front it is thought 
that the top two companies currently have comparable strength in corn and soybeans. For 2009, 
industry sources put Monsanto’s share of the corn seed market a bit above one third, DuPont’s share a 
bit below one third, with Syngenta a somewhat distant third with perhaps 7-8% of the market. In the 
branded soybean seed market, in 2009 Monsanto’s share was near 30%, DuPont’s share a bit lower but 
in the 25-30% range, and Syngenta again third with about 10%.  
 
 
            Table 2. Distribution of Ownership for 
Utility Patents on Varieties, 1995-2009 
(Source: USPTO)  
 
 
 
 
 
Tension Between IPR and Antitrust Laws 
Both IPR laws and antitrust laws share a common ultimate objective—to increase efficiency and thus 
improve the welfare performance of a market economy. But efficiency considerations in an innovation 
context are subtle, and there remains an unresolved tension between the prescriptions of IPR and 
antitrust laws. IPR law aims at increasing welfare by promoting innovation. For this purpose, the grant of 
exclusivity is crucial in providing incentives for private R&D. And, exclusive control of an innovation 
necessarily confers some market power. Antitrust law aims at increasing welfare by promoting 
efficiency. Whereas monopolistic positions are not prohibited per se, certain activities that lead to the 
acquisition or exercise of market power are banned. From the perspective of IPRs, taking an ex ante 
perspective is of paramount importance, and it is recognized that to obtain dynamic innovation gains 
one may need to incur, ex post, some static efficiency losses. This trade-off is inherent to the second-
 
Corn Soybeans 
   
  DuPont 45.7% 21.9% 
  Monsanto 34.7% 41.7% 
  Syngenta 9.3% 6.8% 
  Dow 2.3%  –         
  Stine –         18.1% 
  Other private 7.7% 11.2% 
  Public 0.2% 0.3% 
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best nature of IPRs, but it is a profitable bargain for society, a result that is robust even in the sequential 
innovation setting that characterizes crop breeding (Moschini and Yerokhin, 2008). But ex post, from the 
perspective of antitrust practice, monopolistic positions that result from IPRs are quite visible, and 
sorting out what is a legitimate exercise of IPR-related exclusivity from exclusionary practices that are 
proscribed by antitrust statutes remains difficult.  
 The objective of combining GM traits and germplasm held by different parties gives rise to the 
need for licensing agreements that are typical of so-called technology markets. Licensing in this context 
is generally held to have procompetititve effects because it facilitates the integration of complementary 
factors of production that are essential to assemble a product that has market value. But it is well 
known that restrictive and exclusionary licensing arrangements may run afoul of antitrust rules. The 
“Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property” issued by the DOJ and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) attempt to clarify this tension (DOJ and FTC, 1995). These agencies “recognize that 
intellectual property licensing allows firms to combine complementary factors of production and is 
generally procompetitive,” they “will not require the owner of intellectual property to create 
competition in its own technology,” and note that “the fact that intellectual property may in some cases 
be misappropriated more easily than other forms of property may justify the use of some restrictions 
that might be anticompetitive in other contexts.” But they also note that the per se illegality of a 
number of restraints—such as price fixing—continues to apply to the licensing of intellectual property. 
Furthermore, other restrictive licensing practices, such as exclusive licensing, exclusive dealing, and tying 
arrangements may be found to violate antitrust under the rule of reason, notwithstanding the 
recognized distinctive attributes of technology and innovation markets. 
 
Impact on Farmers 
Farmers benefit from improved seed varieties because of increased expected yields and, with GM traits, 
cost-reducing production practices (e.g., reduced need for pesticides with Bt varieties; simpler and less 
expensive weed control with herbicide tolerant plants). But such benefits come at a price—indeed, 
collecting a higher seed price from farmers for improved seeds is a necessary component of the model 
whereby users pay for the underlying R&D carried out by seed and agrochemical companies. The 
exclusivity granted by IPRs allows the innovator to charge a higher price for the improved seed. Just how 
much depends on a number of issues, including whether the innovation is drastic or non-drastic and 
whether or not the pre-innovation industry is competitive (Moschini and Lapan, 1997). Not surprisingly, 
therefore, we have seen higher prices for biotech seed varieties. Some insights are revealed by data 
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available from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), which started to report separate prices for 
biotech and non-biotech seed varieties in 2001. Such price data, for corn and soybeans, are reported in 
Figure 2.  
 
       Figure 2. U.S. Seed Prices for Corn and Soybeans, 1990-2008 (Source: USDA) 
 
 
It is clear that, for both of these crops, seed prices have increased considerably since the 
introduction of GM crops in 1996, for both biotech and nonbiotech varieties. Simply comparing the last 
available year (2008) to the pre-GM year of 1995, we see that the total seed price increase over this 
period is 139% for biotech corn, 49% for nonbiotech corn, 199% for biotech soybeans, and 96% for 
nonbiotech soybeans. Of some interest is also the price markup charged for GM seeds (relative to 
nonbiotech varieties). Based on the aggregate data reported by the USDA and used for Figure 2, for corn 
this markup has increased from about 29% in 2001 to 60% in 2008. Arguably this reflects, among other 
things, the increased importance of stacked traits in GM corn seed varieties, which now commonly 
combine herbicide resistance with a few insect resistance traits (for example, against corn borer and 
corn rootworm). The situation is somewhat different for soybeans, in which biotech varieties over this 
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entire period have simply contained the same herbicide tolerance traits. Monsanto’s marketing strategy 
for its Roundup Ready trait at first singled out the markup as a distinct technology fee, initially $5 per 
bag and then $6.50 per bag. But in 2001 Monsanto replaced this technology fee paid by growers with a 
royalty system paid by the seed companies licensed to use the trait, leaving the companies with more 
flexibility on pricing their product. Coincidentally with this change it is apparent that the markup for 
essentially the same herbicide tolerance trait in soybeans increased substantially. This markup, which 
amounted to about 40% of the seed price under the technology fee system prior to 2001, has averaged 
70% over the period 2004-2008. 
 
Looking Forward 
For some of the main US crops, the consolidation that has occurred in the seed industry over the last 15 
years has been accompanied by remarkable changes driven by the advent, and strong adoption, of GM 
crops and by the increased role of IPRs. Monsanto played a pioneering role in the development of GM 
traits and at present enjoys a dominant position in such a technology market, although other companies 
have developed or acquired a growing set of competing products. For the purpose of marketing such 
innovations to farmers, as noted, GM traits need to be combined with elite germplasm, the ownership 
of which is also rather concentrated and very much affected by the strengthening of IPR protection in 
this area that has occurred steadily over the last 30 years. Licensing of GM traits is thus an essential 
component of current industry practices. Allegations of anticompetitive practices in this setting have 
surfaced repeatedly in recent years (Moss, 2009). They include exclusionary practices such as exclusive 
dealing arrangements that penalize licensees for dealing with other technology providers, offering 
rebates to seed distributors who limit sales of competing seeds, and anti-stacking restrictions. A 
conclusive assessment of the economics of such alleged actions, however, is problematic at present. The 
licensing of intellectual property entails a number of complex issues, as discussed, and the need to 
safeguard the incentive role of IPRs means that efficiency effects might be construed even for very 
restrictive clauses. Also, licensing contracts in this setting are a private matter between the contracting 
parties, and their details are typically not in the public domain, which is helped by the common practice 
of settling litigations out of court. 
An interesting new issue that will be played out in the next few years concerns the potential for 
“generic” GM traits. Similar to the case of pharmaceuticals, the expiration of patents in principle opens 
the door for suppliers of generic GM seeds. Many patents typically pertain to any one GM trait, but the 
last controlling patent for the original soybean Roundup Ready (RR) trait is set to expire in 2014, and the 
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real possibility of having generic versions of RR soybeans is exciting to many observers. The process will 
not be straightforward, however. The RR trait is wrapped up in branded seeds, and ownership of the 
underlying germplasm might play a role. If IPRs on such seeds were relying on PVP certificates, then 
seed saving by farmers might be a viable solution, at least for soybeans. But existing utility patents on 
GM varieties, which, as noted, have become more and more common in recent years, were they to be 
asserted, could preclude ready availability of generic GM seeds. There are also a host of regulatory 
matters that are germane in this case. While it is in the process of replacing the original RR trait in its 
seeds with a second-generation version with a longer patent protection, as well as other claimed 
advantages, Monsanto has also promised to maintain global regulatory support, through 2017, for the 
original RR trait. It is also on record as being willing to help maintain foreign registration beyond that by 
making available health and safety data needed for regulatory approvals. How all this will play out 
remains to be seen but, as with other issues in this industry, it will provide newer and challenging 
material for economic and legal analyses. 
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